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Abstract 
Current scholarship identifies benefits to both high quality partnerships and extensive networks 
when managing shared policy goals. However, with limited collaborative capacity, many public-
sector agencies are faced with a decision of whether to pursue quality connections with specific 
organizations or more partnerships with an array of organizations. Using survey data from 72 
local air agencies, findings indicate that quality of partnerships are better predictors of improved 
air quality than quantity of partnerships. Conclusions suggest building high quality partnerships 
is more important than having many partnerships when pursuing shared policy goals in a multi-
dimensional environment. 
Keywords: partnership, cross-sector collaboration, intergovernmental relations 
Introduction 
Inter-organizational partnerships are a key to achieving shared policy goals, especially when faced with complex 
problems (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; O’Toole, 2015). Current scholarship identifies benefits of building both high 
quality partnerships and extensive networks of numerous organizations, which include resource sharing and 
transaction cost reduction. However, public-sector agencies have limited collaborative capacity (Provan & Lemaire, 
2012). Therefore, many agencies are faced with a decision of whether to pursue quality connections with specific 
organizations or more partnerships with an array of organizations. There is little evidence to indicate how partnership 
“quality” and “quantity” should be balanced though. Additionally, faced with a multi-dimensional environment 
including both layered intergovernmental and cross-sectoral organizations involved in public service provision, there 
is limited research examining the types of organizations that are best suited for collaborative management of shared 
policy goals (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Berry & Brower, 2014). After literature on public-sector partnerships is 
reviewed, collaboration in U.S. air quality governance is discussed, where local air agencies are situated at the nexus 
of a diverse set of organizations (Fowler, 2018). Then, partnerships are examined using data from a sampling of 72 
local air agencies, with findings indicating that partnership quality is a better predictor of air quality than partnership 
quantity. Conclusions suggest high quality partnerships are more important than many partnerships when pursuing 
shared policy goals in a multi-dimensional environment. 
Partnerships 
Policy governance relies largely on collaboration from a diverse group of public, private, and non-profit organizations 
(Fowler, 2018; Hill & Hupe, 2014; Lecy, Mergel, & Schmitz, 2014; O’Toole, 2000, 2015; Provan & Milward, 2001). 
As such, public administration research finds it increasingly important to understand how collaboration affects public 
service provision (O’Toole, 2000, 2015), and “an important component in almost every contemporary framework 
explaining implementation success and failure has to do with how inter-organizational relationships are managed” 
(Lundin, 2007, p. 631). While a substantial body of literature focuses on whether increasing partnerships results in 
better policy outcomes, “increasing partnerships” may be defined alternatively as organizational investment in 
collaborations (quality) or number of organizations partnered with (quantity) (Berry, et al., 2004; McGuire & 
Agranoff, 2011; McQuaid, 2010; O’Toole, 2015; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). In relation to quality, several scholars 
attempt to differentiate between collaboration and cooperation in formal partnership arrangements. Although these 
distinctions are not made here, collaboration tends to refer to higher-order forms of partnership while cooperation to 
lower-order forms, with each lending itself to different managerial strategies and tools (Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 
2007; McNamara, 2012; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Others have focused on issues such as the size, scope, and density 
of networks as an important factor in defining managerial efforts (Graddy & Chen, 2006; Huang & Provan, 2007; Lee, 
Lee, & Feiock, 2012; O’Toole, 2015). 
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Given processing limitations though, both high quality and quantity in partnerships is impractical, and public-sector 
agencies are forced to make strategic choices (Smith & Larimer, 2009). Collaborations are faced with “operational, 
performance, or legal barriers that prevent the next action step… [and] face challenges in converting solutions into 
policy energy, assessing internal effectiveness, surmounting the inevitable process blockages, mission drift, and so 
on” (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011, p. 265). When successful, partnerships result in more effective outcomes as a result 
of: enhanced flexibility, innovation, and responsiveness; coordinated efforts; and, capacity and resource sharing 
(McQuaid, 2010; O’Toole, 2015; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). Importantly, both tangible (e.g., funding) and intangible 
(e.g., credibility) resources enhance organizational capacity, with intangible resources providing political capital to 
mitigate risk and conflict (Andrew, 2009; Feiock, Lee, Park, & Lee, 2010; Provan & Huang, 2012). Additionally, 
collaboration reduces transaction (i.e., managerial) costs of inter-organizational barriers by coordinating efforts and 
decreasing uncertainty via more knowledge and experience (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997). 
On the other hand, partnerships prove ineffective when there is a lack of trust, differing missions, deficient 
commitment to shared goals, or divergent cultures (Provan & Lemaire, 2012; Provan & Milward, 2001). 
Consequently, partnerships are driven by organizational desires to increase resources and reduce transaction costs in 
public service delivery, with partnerships waning as resources contract, costs increase, or distributions become 
inequitable (Fowler, 2018; Graddy & Chen, 2006; Lee, Lee, & Feiock, 2012; Park & Rethemeyer, 2014). 
However, organizations risk decreased efficiency and effectiveness, via conflicts over goals, objectives, and resource 
sharing; loss of organizational autonomy; and, inter- organizational power dynamics (McQuaid, 2010; O’Toole, 2015; 
Provan & Lemaire, 2012). Therefore, balancing quality and quantity in partnership is a function of resource exchanges 
and transaction costs in coordinating organizations around shared policy goals. Furthermore, public- sector agencies 
“work [with] a variety of different kinds of actors...drawn from different organizational cultures, influenced by 
different sets of incentives, and directed toward different goals” (Hall & O’Toole, 2004, p. 190). As such, federal, 
state, local, nonprofit, and private organizations offer different advantages and disadvantages. For example, Andrews 
and Entwistle (2010), examining cross-sectoral partnerships in the United Kingdom, finds “public-public partnership 
is positively associated with effectiveness, efficiency, and equity, but that public-private partnership is negatively 
associated with effectiveness and equity. Public- nonprofit partnership is unrelated to performance” (p. 679). 
Additionally, these organizational differences lead to certain types of organizations being better suited for quality and 
others to quantity of ties, based on policy specific enterprises. For instance, in examining intergovernmental 
collaboration in Sweden, Lundin (2007) finds effectiveness is a function of policy complexity, and shared goals must 
be matched with advantages inherent in certain types of organizations. However, there are few assessments of how 
partnership quality and quantity with certain organizational types impact collaborative outcomes (Andrews & 
Entwistle, 2010; McQuaid, 2010; Scholtz, Berardo, & Kile, 2008). 
Quality 
While scholars may measure quality in partnership along numerous dimensions, in the most basic sense, it refers to 
levels of organizational investment in collaboration (i.e., dedication to collaboration). As partnership quality increases, 
organizations invest more of their organizational resources, capacities, and missions into collaborative arrangements, 
becoming more intertwined and reducing barriers that lead to inter-organizational transaction costs. Most assessments 
of partnership characteristics focus on qualitative aspects, such as strategic focus and leadership, trust, capacity, and/or 
outcome orientation, as essential qualities for successful partnerships (McGuire & Silvia, 2009; McQuaid, 2010; 
Provan & Lemaire, 2012). However, some scholars articulate levels or hierarchies of partnership quality, depth, or 
intensity. Sockett (1998) presents a four part quasi-hierarchical model where partnerships range from rudimentary to 
fully intertwined organizations: 1) support services; 2) resource exchanges; 3) joint planning and resource sharing; 
and, 4) full integration of functions. On the other hand, Waddock (1991) offers a slightly more sophisticated model in 
which partnerships are a function of organizational interdependence at administration, technical, and institutional 
levels. Common among these models is that levels of partnership are tied to how invested organizations are in 
collaborations, with arrangements creating more interdependence associated with higher degrees of quality (Hodge & 
Greve, 2007; Kemshall & Ross, 2000; Teisman & Klijn, 2002;). 
While these typologies suggest quality engagement leads to better management of shared policy goals, increased 
quality also leads to increased opportunity costs, which may create new limitations to program effectiveness. Creating 
interdependence with one organizations reduces capacity to pursue similar arrangements with other organizations, 
creating substantial opportunity costs in an environment with a broad of array of potential partners offering different 
advantages (Hicklin, O’Toole, & Meier, 2008). Furthermore, there is significant risk associated with a loss of 
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organizational independence, with autonomy connected to key tools for successful policy governance such as 
flexibility and innovation capacity (Laven, et al., 2010; McQuaid, 2010; Robins, Bates, & Pattison, 2011). 
Additionally, intertwining organizations exacerbates classic problems associated with reduced accountability in 
collaborative arrangements, where it is difficult to hold individual actors responsible for their contributions to shared 
goals (Piatak, Romzek, LeRoux, & Johnston, 2018; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). 
Quantity 
As partnership quantity increases, new organizations offer access to new resources and reduce inter-organizational 
transaction costs; however, multiplexity increases with each new organization, multiplying ties and coordination costs. 
A significant body of network research suggests transaction costs of forming partnerships and managing shared policy 
goals are reduced as partners increase, with network experience and the number of available partners as significant 
predictors of partnerships (Brown & Potoski, 2003; Clingermayer & Feiock, 1997; Fowler, 2018; Graddy & Chen, 
2006; Heranz, 2010). Additionally, each new partner brings with it more resources, and an expanded capacity for 
coordinating efforts, adding further benefit to network size. Thus, organizations seek more partners in networks to 
increase their access to resources and reduce their transaction costs. However, Provan and Milward (2001) contends 
that “after surpassing a certain size, any network will become less effective because of increasing coordination costs” 
(p. 418). 
As networks expand, there is increased effort required to direct multiple autonomous organizations in concomitant 
tasks, resultant from increased complexity and decision-making layers. Essentially, partnerships replace transaction 
costs from inter-organizational barriers with those from coordinating organizations, which are intensified by both 
internal organizational and external network factors (Agranoff, 2007; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). When networks 
become overburdened by coordination costs, it leads to “overprocessing” and eventually “collaborative inertia” 
(McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). Furthermore, additional partners add further challenges to 
accountability, as more organizations contribute to a shared goal but provide unequal resources and efforts in the 
process (Provan & Lemaire, 2012). This is exacerbated by the number of organizations producing public goods and 
services in a multi- dimensional environmental, creating a very complex balance between resources and transaction 
costs for each additional partner (Hill & Hupe, 2014). 
Multi-Dimensional Partnerships in Air Quality 
Local air agencies sit at the nexus of a multi-dimensional environment of potential organizational partners with a 
shared policy goal of reducing air pollutants within specific geographic areas, presenting a ripe case to analyze 
partnerships. Although it is within a hierarchical intergovernmental arrangement, implementation of the U.S. Clean 
Air Act (CAA) of 1970 (amended in 1977 and 1990) functions more as a network with fluid membership and 
organizational independence (Fowler, 2018). Common in environmental legislation, the CAA relies on a federal-state 
partnership in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sets broad standards for six criteria pollutants (i.e., 
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards or NAAQS), and states develop implementation plans (i.e., State 
Implementation Plans or SIPs) and manage day-to-day operations (Belden, 2001; Fowler, 2016, 2018). However, roles 
of local governments in this arrangement fluctuate between states, with local agencies operating as either 
administrative sub-units of state agencies, with autonomy to pursue their own initiatives, or not at all (Fowler, 2016, 
2018; Lester & Lombard, 1998; Woods & Potoski, 2010). Additionally, limited jurisdictions results in local agencies 
finding collaboration necessary to impact air quality outcomes (Fowler, 2016, 2018). 
Due to the nature of air quality and governing legislation, intergovernmental (or public- public) partnerships tend to 
be preferred by local agencies. Since geographic and legal jurisdictions tend to be divided between many public-sector 
agencies, it is difficult for a single agency to effectively address complex policy problems that transect jurisdictions, 
such as air quality (Krause, 2011; Lee & Koski, 2015). As such, intergovernmental partnerships coordinate efforts 
across jurisdictions to better match shared goals with problem parameters, creating more effective outcomes (Andrews 
& Entwistle, 2010; Raab & Milward, 2003; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). With both vertical (different levels 
government) and horizontal (same level of government) partnerships, coordination reduces inter-organizational 
barriers and managerial transaction costs via economies of scale, increased scales of operations, and by containing 
problems with a coordinated institutional arrangement (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Keast et al, 2004; O’Toole & 
Christensen, 2012; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). 
 
This is an author-produced, peer-reviewed version of this article. The final, definitive version of this document can be found online a Public 
Performance & Management Review, published by Routledge. Copyright restrictions may apply. doi: 10.1080/15309576.2018.1562946 
4 
Vertical partners scale up efforts creating large opportunities for resource sharing and transaction cost reduction, but 
also encompass their partners. For local air agencies, partnering directly with state and federal agencies provides 
additional resources, but severely limits their autonomy to innovate and match policies to local needs (Lester & 
Lombard, 1998; Woods & Potoski, 2010). Since higher-level governments retain coercive power over lower-level 
counterparts within the federal system, vertical partnerships tend to be far less collaborative than partnerships with 
other types of organizations (Agranoff & McGuire, 1999; Scicchitano & Hedge, 1993; Zimmerman, 2009). As such, 
there are multiple examples in which local and/or state agencies were conscripted into serving as subunits of higher-
level agencies (Lester & Lombard, 1998; Scicchitano & Hedge, 1993; Woods & Potoski, 2010). Furthermore, state 
and federal missions tend to be restrained to maintaining or achieving NAAQS compliance for geographic units (i.e., 
monitoring sites), and not universally improving air quality. Therefore, local areas that are unlikely to exceed standards 
get limited attention and resources from vertical partners. Local air agencies surveyed for this study reported vertical 
intergovernmental partners included environmental protection, transportation, and health agencies that deal with 
pollution issues at state- and federal-levels. 
On the other hand, horizontal intergovernmental partnerships coordinate efforts across comparative jurisdictions. As 
such, inter-local partnerships are well poised to reduce transaction costs associated with problems that transects 
borders (Ling, 2002; Warner & Bel, 2008). In air quality, horizontal partnerships provide an opportunity “to coordinate 
projects and initiatives across regions and sectors to expand the impact of projects that would otherwise be too limited 
in scale to a have a substantive impact” (Fowler, 2016, p. 184). Nevertheless, other local agencies are direct 
competitors so replacing competition with collaboration carries risk as partners bargain and negotiate their relationship 
(Kwon & Feiock, 2010). As such, when benefit sharing becomes inequitable, partners stop complying and devolve to 
competitive behavior, resulting in a loss of efficiency and effectiveness (Bennett & Howe, 1998; Chen & Thurmaier, 
2009). For local air agencies, cooperative relationships provide other localities competitive advantages in recruiting 
mobile citizens or businesses, or suffer from issues of shared accountability where other localities enjoy benefits 
without costs. Local air agencies surveyed for this study reported horizontal intergovernmental partners included 
environmental protection, transportation, and health agencies in neighboring jurisdictions. 
While intergovernmental partnerships offer advantages in managing air pollutants, public-sector agencies are also 
constrained by economic and political realities, leaving certain limitations insurmountable. As such, cross-sectoral 
partnerships allow for coordination with both emissions producers and community advocates, enhancing capacity in 
new directions. Private organizations as purveyors of stationary source emissions are a key partner, with many working 
with public and nonprofit organizations at the local-level to reduce their environmental impact (NAC, 2017; NALGEP, 
2017). In general, public-private partnerships provide public- sector agencies ready access to marketplace resources, 
which include funds, technical expertise, flexibility, shared risk, and innovation capacity (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; 
Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Additionally, private organizations have increased pressure for efficiency and access to 
resources that would otherwise be unavailable to public-sector organizations (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Cohen & 
Eimicke, 2008). Specifically for air quality, public-private partnerships allow local agencies to coordinate efforts 
directly with sources of air pollutants, making for more effective policy approaches than traditional regulations 
(Bemelmans-Videc, Rist, & Vedung, 2010). Local air agencies surveyed for this study reported private partners 
included local business and utilities as well as trade associations. 
On the other hand, nonprofits are “particularly well placed to understand and voice the needs of disadvantaged, 
excluded, and underrepresented groups” (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010, p. 684). As such, nonprofits reduce transaction 
costs in creating equity and fairness, where local agencies are constrained by jurisdictions, politics, and economics 
(Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). Nevertheless, while most nonprofits focus on underrepresented populations, 
environmental nonprofits tend to focus on environment advocacy, rather than people (Nikolic & Koontz, 2008; Wallis 
& Dollery, 2006; Weisbrod, 1997). Additionally, environmental nonprofits play an important role in policymaking, 
but there is limited research on their roles in public service provisions (Nikolic & Koontz, 2008; Sharp, Daley, & 
Lynch, 2011). In air quality, nonprofit activities tend to supplement local initiatives, via advocacy and outreach 
campaigns, consulting with emission sources, and/or organizing regional cooperative networks. Local air agencies 
surveyed for this study reported nonprofit partners included environmental protection, health, and sustainability 
focused advocacy groups. However, cross-sectoral partnerships also suffer from conflicting missions, information 
asymmetries, and goal incongruity, leading to new transaction costs. Primary issues surround whether meaningful 
collaboration is possible or if missions are irreconcilable. This is exacerbated in environmental policy, where private-
sector organizations are key sources of pollutants and nonprofits are chiefly focused on political advocacy. As such, 
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there are both successes and failures of cross-sectoral partnerships with differences usually explained by 
organizational-level capacity to manage incompatibilities and create accountability (Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008; Gazley 
& Brudney, 2007; Hodge & Greve, 2007; Skelcher, 2005; Wang & Zhao, 2014). 
Methods 
Data 
To collect data, the author surveyed managers of the 117 local government members of the National Association of 
Clean Air Agencies (NACAA). Of 81 total respondents (68.6%), 26 (32.1%) responded via mail and 55 (67.9%) 
responded digitally; however, only 72 (61.0%) completed enough of the survey to be usable for this analysis. Previous 
research indicates this is the most accurate list of local air agencies with dedicated air quality missions and that are 
engaged in air quality networks (Fowler, 2016, 2018; Woods & Potoski, 2010). Furthermore, the NACAA’s mission 
is “to encourage the exchange of information, to enhance communication and cooperation among federal, state, and 
local regulatory agencies, and to promote good management of our air resources” (NACAA, 2017). As such, managers 
of member agencies should have some knowledge of partnership norms in air quality via interactions with NACAA, 
which may include education and training, conventions and symposium, and service to the association. Additionally, 
as respondents averaged approximately 23 years and 19 years working in the public sector and with air quality issues, 
respectively, they likely have significant personal experience and professional networks, which contribute to their 
expertise in this area. 
Respondents are both diverse and representative of NACAA membership regionally and institutionally. NACAA 
local-level membership represents 26 states and the District of Columbia (D.C.), with 50% from the West region, 
25.4% from the South, 4.2% from the Northeast, and 20.3 from the Midwest. In comparison, survey respondents 
represent 22 states and D.C., with 51.3% from the West, 22.5% from the South, 5.0% from the Northeast, and 21.3% 
from the Midwest. Additionally, NACAA membership is 21.2% city agencies, 32.2% county agencies, and 46.7% 
regional agencies (i.e., planning districts or consolidated city- counties). In comparison, survey respondents are 17.5% 
from city governments, 37.5% from county governments, and 45% from regional governments. Finally, respondents 
report a range of sizes for their agencies. In terms of employees, 39% report less than 10 employees, 18% between 11 
and 20, 20% between 21 and 40, and 24% over 40. In terms of budget, 32% report less $1 million, 32% between $1 
and 3 million, 12% between $3 and 5 million, and 25% over $5 million. Based on available data, the survey sample 
does not differ significantly from that of the NACAA membership as a whole. 
Dependent Variable 
The author models the dependent variable as annual median air quality index (AQI) for monitoring sites associated 
with local air agencies. It is assumed that local air agencies are organized around improving air quality in their 
respective monitoring sites, with existing air quality conditions serving as the best measure of agency effectiveness. 
AQI operates as a piecewise linear function of pollutant concentration to create a standardized, comparable measure 
of six criteria pollutants, measured on a scale from 0 to 500 (EPA, 2017b). AQI data were obtained from EPA’s 
AirData system for each MSA and µSA (EPA, 2017a). Appendix A summarizes descriptive statistics for all variables. 
Partnership Variables 
Summarized in Table 1, the author measures partnership with two constructs (quality vs. quantity) along five 
categories (other local, state, federal, nonprofit, and private), with Likert scale responses ranging from strongly 
disagree to strongly agree. For models comparing cross- sectoral relationships, average of local, state, and federal 
categories creates an aggregate measure of intergovernmental partnership. The author phrased questions in broad 
terms to capture general perceptions of quality and quantity of working relationships across categories of partners, 
rather than the character of specific partnerships. For both items, binary (i.e., yes/no) response options enquire into 
simple existence of partnerships within categories of organizations. However, with Likert scale response options, 
items force respondents to provide a qualitative rating of partnerships, where one end of the spectrum represents high 
“quality” or “quantity” and the other end represents its inverse. 
[Table 1 about here] 
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Since partnership quality may vary between organizational categories, partnership forms, agency cultures, or return 
on investment, weak partnerships for some may be substantive to others or vice versa. For example, if agencies are 
highly invested in partnerships but perceive an inequitable return on that investment, they are likely to judge overall 
quality as lower than an organization with similar returns but a lower investment. As such, the author phrased the 
quality item to elicit a qualitative judgment that balances both pros and cons of specific partnerships when formulating 
an ordinal rating. In other words, respondent perceptions consider both how invested their organizations are in 
partnerships and how that investment is balanced against issues such as opportunity costs and accountability. On the 
other hand, since air quality networks vary across geographic areas, organizations working on air quality in one area 
may not be doing so in other areas. As such, the author phrases the quantity item to focus judgement on number of 
partners when considering available partners. In other words, respondents provide an ordinal rating of how well their 
actual number of partners compare to their potential number of partners, with potential being defined by their own 
assessment of the service market place (i.e., are they working with everyone they could be?). After data collection, 
the author recoded the quantity item so an increased rating corresponded to an increase in perceived quantity. 
Importantly, collaborative arrangements may not be interchangeable when working with a diverse set of partners with 
different jurisdictions, authorities, and missions (Berry & Brower, 2014). For instance, contracting is more likely for 
public-private partnerships and service agreements more likely for inter-local partnerships, which creates challenges 
for comparing quality and quantity. As such, objective measures of these complex concepts across a range of 
organizations in different service market places may not effectively capture the nuanced differences that exist. 
However, allowing respondents to use their qualitative judgments of the specific dynamics of their partnerships 
mitigates some of these challenges. Essentially, rather than attempt to create an objective “measuring stick” for quality 
and quantity that is universally applicable, this research design relies on survey respondents to identify the important 
aspects of their partnerships which define quality and quantity, and then apply a rating to it. Additionally, this approach 
also allows measurement with a simple ordinal rating that is comparable across a diverse set of organizational 
partnerships. Therefore, the quality and quantity measures are respondent perception of their partnerships based on 
subjective, qualitative interpretations within their specific context, which control for variations such as those that arise 
across localities, categories of organizations, and forms of partnership. While perceptions allow respondents to judge 
these complexities within individual contexts, analyses examine perceived quality and quantity and not objectively 
measured quality and quantity, creating limitations to the findings. 
Based on these measures, if perceived partnership quality increases, then air quality will improve (i.e., AQI decreases) 
as a result of corresponding increases in coordinated efforts and resource sharing, and decreased transaction costs. On 
the other hand, if perceived partnership quantity increases, then air quality will not improve at a similar rate as a result 
of increased coordination costs that also occur. In other words, quality will have a stronger impact than quantity. These 
effects are a function of rates at which benefits of coordinated efforts, resource sharing, and reduced transaction costs 
increase compared to opportunity and coordination transaction costs. For partnership quality, benefits increase at a 
higher rate than costs. However, for quantity, additional organizations multiply costs of coordinating all organizations, 
and cause costs to increase at a rate similar to benefits. Consequently, costs and benefits of additional partners largely 
counterbalance each other, and improvements in program outcomes do not materialize (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; 
Provan & Lemaire, 2012; Provan & Milward, 2001). Consequently, quality is more scalable than quantity, so increased 
quality will lead to more effective program outcomes while quantity will not. However, these effects will likely be 
highly dependent on the categories of partners involved, because costs and benefits are not equal when partners offer 
different advantages in managing air quality. 
Control Variables 
The author also uses three other independent variables to control for socio-economic and environmental factors that 
typically influence air quality. First, previous studies report that both economic development and political capital of 
industrial sectors affect environmental outcomes, and control for these effects by measuring comparative strength of 
industries producing pollutants or affected by relevant policy and/or managerial efforts (Fowler, 2016; Ringquist, 
1993a, 1993b; Sapat, 2004). Since gross domestic product from industries that are primary stationary sources of air 
pollutants (i.e., manufacturing) is unavailable at the local-level, the author uses employee compensation for these 
industries instead. As such, this measure provides a point of economic comparison of manufacturing industries at the 
local-level (Fowler, 2016). Industry is measured as $1,000s of employee compensation from manufacturing industries 
per capita to control for these effects, with data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (U.S. BEA, 2017). Second, 
as CAA implementation’s core, state investment in air quality plays a central role in shaping outcomes. As such, state 
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environmental expenditures control for state capacity and resources (Fowler, 2016, 2018; Konisky & Woods, 2012; 
Potoski & Woods, 2002; Ringquist, 1993a, 1993b). The author obtained data from the U.S. Census Bureau, with 
expenditures measured in dollars per capita (U.S. Census, 2017). Finally, since air quality is contingent on previously 
existing conditions, annual median AQI for initial observation year controls for existing pollution levels and 
environmental differences (Bacot & Dawes, 1997; Fowler, 2012; Potoski & Woods, 2002; Sapat, 2004; Ringquist, 
1993b).1 
Analysis 
First, the authors examine variation in quality and quantity across types of partners, using Spearman’s Rho (Margolis, 
2008). Then, Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regression tests effects on air quality outcomes. With a relatively small 
dataset and initial statistical diagnostics indicating heteroscedasticity, GLS is a better fit than Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression (Fox, 2008; Graddy & Wang, 2008). Further statistical diagnostics indicated no issues with the GLS 
models. To allow for time-delayed effects in air quality outcomes, data for the dependent variable are lagged three 
years and observed for 2016, while predicator variables are observed for 2013 (Fowler, 2012, 2016; Ringquist, 1993a, 
1993b).2  Three models test (intergovernmental, cross-sectoral, and multi-dimensional) both partnership quality and 
quantity effects. 
Results 
Table 2 displays correlation statistics within and between categories of partners. Inter- construct relationships are 
positive across partner categories with quality and quantity increasing together. Inter-construct relationships generally 
fall into the moderate range, with the strongest relationship for federal (.493) and weakest for local (.256). Intra-
construct relationships are positive across partner categories as expected and generally range from weak to strong, 
with the strongest relationship for state-federal quantity (.699) and the weakest for local-nonprofit quantity (.174). 
Correlation analysis suggests two findings. First, while correlated, quality and quantity represent distinct constructs. 
Second, each construct is unique across categories of partner. In other words, quality is developed separately from 
quantity, and both are separately developed across intergovernmental and cross-sectoral dimensions. 
[Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents results for partnership effects on air quality outcomes when quality and quantity are separated into 
different models. Coefficients for local partnership in the intergovernmental and multi-dimensional models indicate 
that increased perceived partnership quality with local agencies is associated with better air quality outcomes (i.e., 
decreased median annual AQI). Additionally, coefficients for non-profit and private partnerships in the cross-sectoral 
model indicate that increased quality with private organizations is associated with better air quality outcomes, but 
increased quality with nonprofits has the opposite effect. Findings for federal, state, and aggregate intergovernmental 
partnership quality were not statistically significant in any models. On the other hand, coefficients for state 
partnerships in the intergovernmental and multi-dimensional models indicate that decreased perceived quantity of 
partnerships with state agencies is associated with better air quality outcomes. The coefficient for non-profit 
partnership in the multi-dimensional model indicates that decreased partnership quantity with nonprofits is associated 
with worse air quality outcomes. However, findings are not statistically significant in the cross-sectoral model. 
Findings for local, federal, aggregate intergovernmental, and private partnerships were not statistically significant in 
any model. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents results for partnership effects on air quality outcomes when quality and quantity are tested in 
combined models. Findings are similar to those presented in Table 3. Coefficients for local and private partnership 
indicate that increased perceived partnership quality is associated with better air quality outcomes. Additionally, 
coefficients for non-profit partnership indicate that decreased quality is associated with better air quality outcomes. 
However, findings for state and nonprofit partnership quantity were not statistically significant. Additionally, findings 
for state, federal, and aggregated intergovernmental quality, and local, federal, aggregated intergovernmental, and 
private quantity were not statistically significant. In general, coefficients and statistical significance between models 
were consistent, including those for industry, state expenditures, and median AQI, which suggests reliability of results. 
Pseudo- R2 statistics indicate all models are moderately strong predictors of air quality. 
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[Table 4 about here] 
Statistical analyses suggest three general findings. First, quality inter-local and public- private partnerships present 
the best options for improving air quality. This finding is similar to previous scholarship on cooperative benefits 
associated with inter-local agreements and public- private partnerships in general, and the need for local collaboration 
in air quality in particular (Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Fowler, 2016; Hodge & Greve, 2007). Quality inter-local and 
public- private partnerships are likely effective as they most directly coordinate efforts around the nature of air quality 
by integrating both sources of emissions and geographic jurisdictions into management efforts. Second, there were 
either no statistically significant or mixed findings for partnerships with federal agencies and nonprofits, respectively. 
As most federal agencies are hands-off in dealing with local area specifics in environmental programs (unless there is 
a substantive violation of national standards), federal agencies provide few advantages in resources and transaction 
costs. Findings for nonprofits are a little more difficult to decipher though. It seems that more partnership in either 
aspect does not lead to better air quality outcomes. Nonprofits may be ill-suited for partnerships in air quality 
altogether, which may be due to the advocacy nature of environmental nonprofits. However, this finding needs to be 
further explored to better understand how public-nonprofit partnerships for environmental management function. 
Finally, findings for state agencies were particularly interesting. While both low quality and quantity partnerships with 
state agencies are associated with better air outcomes, quantity was only statistically significant in models from Table 
3, and quality was not significant in any model. However, states serve as the lynchpins in CAA implementation, which 
would suggest theoretically that they play an important role in air quality governance. One possible explanation for 
these findings is that there is significant risk for local agencies in partnering with states. As the CAA incentivizes 
states to focus efforts on NAAQS compliance, local agencies in areas less likely to be in violation receive fewer 
resources, which accounts for partnership quality’s lack of effects. More importantly though, state-local partnerships 
decrease autonomy and accountability for local governments, resulting in less local capacity to innovate and 
responsibility for outcomes (Fowler 2016, 2018). In other words, if a primary source of local-level policy innovation 
loses independence, effectiveness decreases. On the other hand, local governments with fewer ties to state agencies 
are independent to develop new initiatives. Thus, fewer state-local ties may provide local agencies more room for 
innovation and accountability for program success, allowing programs to better adapt to the local context. In effect, 
these findings suggest that cooperation within the conventional federal hierarchy may not improve air quality. 
Conclusions 
Partnerships work to improve policy outcomes and public services by using collaboration to enhance capacities to 
manage wicked problems. However, these findings indicate that effectiveness is impacted by two dimensions: 1) 
quality versus quantity; and 2) type of partner. First, quality should be prioritized over quantity when managing shared 
policy goals. Findings indicate that increased quality is a much better predictor of improved air quality than increased 
quantity. Higher degrees of collaboration between organizations reduce barriers to resource sharing and that create 
inter-organizational transaction cost, with new costs increasing at modest levels compared to new benefits (Hicklin, 
O’Toole, & Meier, 2008). As a result, there are scalable benefits to partnership quality, so partnerships that work at 
any level of quality have a high ceiling for increasing effectiveness; although, there may be a point of diminishing 
returns. On the other hand, partnership quantity is less scalable, where new partners multiply coordination costs for 
all partners (McGuire & Agranoff, 2011; Provan & Lemaire, 2012). As a result, costs increase at a relatively high rate 
compared to benefits, and improved program outcomes are less likely to materialize. As partnerships require a balance 
between benefits and costs to be effective, quality provides a better avenue for striking that balance than quantity does, 
making it a better choice for organizations seeking to increase collaboration. 
Second, partnerships should be well-matched for policy problems at hand, and offer the types of resources and 
transaction cost reductions necessary to improve outcomes. Findings indicate that inter-local and public-private 
partnerships produce better air quality outcomes. For managing air quality in metropolitan areas, localities need to 
coordinate efforts across adjacent geographies, and reduce transaction costs of working with industry. Partnerships 
with neighboring localities allow local agencies to better match resources with problem parameters, while public-
private partnerships coordinate efforts with emission sources. On the other hand, vertical partnerships reduce local 
autonomy, and lead to duplications of existing efforts and constrain innovation. Specific to air quality, state-local 
relations tend to devolve to local agencies serving as administrative subunits of states, leading to overlapping rather 
than complementing efforts. As previous scholarship argues, the power of local governments in managing air quality 
comes from capacity to innovate and match policies with social, economic, and political needs (Fowler, 2016).  
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Findings for state partnership quantity provides some evidence to this point, where additional coordinating costs and 
reduced local autonomy had a negative impact on air quality (i.e., increased AQI). In sum, partnerships are only 
effective when organizations offer the right advantages for problems being managed. 
While the findings here provide some interesting insights into how partnership quality and quantity affect program 
outcomes, the research design has two important limitations. First, there are several assumptions made about how 
respondents are interpreting survey items. Most importantly, the authors assume that respondents are appropriately 
interpreting the survey items and isolating the two distinct aspects of partnerships when responding to each item. 
Although these survey items were designed to capture quality and quantity as distinct analytical concepts, respondents 
may not have responded in the way that they were meant to, leading to potential measurement error. Additionally, the 
authors assumed that respondents have some expertise on the norms of air quality partnerships and considered those 
while responding. However, levels of expertise may vary and some respondents may be less aware of how their 
partnership behavior compares to others. Second, ordinal ratings do not allow statistical analyses to capture potential 
economies of scale or points of diminishing returns in quality or quantity of partnerships. As previous scholars argue, 
collaboration costs eventually outweigh benefits and overburden organizations, leading to decreased effectiveness 
(Hicklin, O’Toole, & Meier, 2008; Provan and Milward, 2001). While respondents may have considered this when 
rating their partnership, statistical analyses do not directly incorporate these issues, which limits inferences into the 
more sophisticated facets of these relationships. 
Furthermore, additional research should consider how collaborative mechanisms associated with different types of 
organizations translate into program outcomes. Public-nonprofits partnerships highlight this, where findings for 
neither quality nor quantity were as predicted. However, these findings are consistent with previous research that 
indicates public-nonprofit partnerships affect public service delivery differently than intergovernmental or public-
private partnerships (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010). As such, further research should focus on how quality or quantity 
impact partnerships with specific types of organizations (Andrews & Entwistle, 2010; Lundin, 2007). Additionally, in 
order to understand the scalability of these relationships, there should be further examination of how points of 
diminishing returns compare between quality and quantity. Finally, future research should explore other research 
designs that incorporate both qualitative and more sophisticated quantitative methodologies, such as time-series 
analyses, to examine how collaborative mechanisms unfold over time to impact outcomes and how network-level 
components translate into community-level outcomes. Understanding which directions to develop cooperative 
relationships is a key to building more effective public-sector collaborations. 
Notes 
1. In empirical models, this variable accounts for a majority of explained variance, as the strongest predictor of 
future conditions is usually past conditions. Consequently, analyses are limited in isolating individual effects of 
partnership variables. One possible solution to this problem is to use differences between initial and lagged AQI 
as the dependent variable to examine only changes that occur during the study timeframe. However, this method 
assumes that a one point change results from the same level of inputs if AQI is 10 or 100, but environmental 
remediation tends to become more costly as pollutants approach zero (Breyer, 1993). While this method may 
inaccurately estimate relationships, it does indicate strength of correlations during a set timeframe. To this end, 
GLS models use initial AQI to control for existing pollution levels and examine directional relationships of 
partnership variables. In supplement, Appendix B presents R2 statistics for bivariate Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) regression models that use the difference approach to the dependent variable and indicate how strongly 
individual partnership variables and air quality change during the study timeframe are correlated. Consistent 
with other findings, these R2 statistics indicate that partnership quality with local agencies and private 
organizations have the strongest correlations with AQI changes. On the other hand, partnership quantity has 
extremely weak relationships with AQI changes. In comparison to other findings presented here, these findings 
indicate that some partnership variables account for a notable portion of air quality outcomes, and pseudo-R2 in 
GLS models are not entirely driven by control variables. 
2. The authors tested multiple lag variations with results similar to those reported here, but diagnostic tests 
indicated the three-year lag is the best fit for the data 
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Tables 
Table 1. Measurement of Partnership Constructs and Categories 
Construct Categories Responses 
1. Quality: My office actively 
cooperates or partners with 
[dimension] working on air quality 
issues in my area. 
2. Quantity (recoded): There are 
[dimension] working on air quality 
issues in my area that my office does 
not cooperate or partner with. 
1. Other local agencies 
2. State agencies 
3. Federal agencies 
4. Nonprofit 
organizations 
5. Private organizations 
1. Strongly Disagree 
2. Somewhat 
Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Somewhat Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
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Table 2. Correlations of Constructs Across Categories 
  Quality Quantity 
 Quality/ 
Quantity 
Local State Federal Non-profit Local State Federal Non-profit 
Local .256*         
State .314** .281* .553** 
Federal .493** .487** .455**   .448** .699**   
Non-profit .257* .263* .344** .465**  .174 .300* .325**  
Private .328** .299* .317** .522** .516** .285* .411** .336** .572** 
N = 72. Note: *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. 
Table 3. GLS Results for Partnership Quality and Quantity in Separate Models 
 Intergovernmental Cross-Sectoral Multi-Dimensional 
 Quality Quantity Quality Quantity Quality Quantity 
Local -1.286 (.586)* -.606 (.554)   -1.116 (.562)* -.630 (.539) 
State .924 (.816) 1.015 (.587)+   1.075 (.780) 1.018 (.585)+ 
Federal .275 (.517) -.408 (.581)   .384 (.547) -.177 (.574) 
Intergovt.   .025 (.845) .149 (.607)   
Nonprofit 1.232 (.632)+ -.818 (.517) 1.084 (.620)+ -.839 (.505)+ 
Private -1.022 (.503)* .600 (.582) -1.108 (.485)* .491 (.568) 
Industry -.644 (.302)* -.695 (.313)* -.778 (.328)* -.585 (.301)* -.844 (.321)** -.716 (.303)* 
State Exp. -.053 (.011)*** -.051 (.012)*** -.048 (.011)*** -.048 (.011)*** -.053 (.011)*** -.050 (.012)*** 
Med. AQI .698 (.039)*** .676 (.038)*** .667 (.039)*** .661 (.039)*** .686 (.039)*** .659 (.038)*** 
Constant 16.640 17.562 16.791 17.552 15.571 17.926 
Pseudo R2 .251 .258 .263 .258 .274 .277 
BIC 429.231 425.102 422.262 425.029 425.042 423.443 
N 72 71 71 71 71 70 
Note: +<.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. 
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Table 4. GLS Results for Partnership Quality and Quantity in Combined Models 
 Intergovernmental Cross-Sectoral 
Quality Quantity Quality 
 
 
 
Quantity 
Local -1.053 (.604)+ -.647 (.551)
State 1.035 (.824) .843 (.682) 
Federal .127 (.677) -.469 (.570) 
Intergovernmental .034 (.915) .123 (.674) 
Nonprofit 1.166 (.637)+ -.632 (.536) 
Private -.876 (.526)+ .454 (.570) 
Industry -.786 (.314)* -.802 (.339)* 
State Expenditures -.056 (.012)*** -.049 (.011)*** 
Median AQI .695 (.039)*** .656 (.040)*** 
 
 
 
 
Constant 17.470 17.257 
Pseudo R2 .266 .266 
BIC 433.688 433.524 
N 71 71 
Note: +<.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A. Variable Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description Mean 
(or 
%) 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Median AQI 
(Dependent Variable) 
Annual median AQI, lagged three years 
behind predictor variables 
46.49 9.86 20 77 
Local (quality) Likert scale response to quality survey item 
for local category 
4.31 .87 1 5 
State (quality) Likert scale response to quality survey item 
for state category 
4.64 .63 3 5 
Federal (quality) Likert scale response to quality survey item 
for federal category 
4.07 1.04 1 5 
Intergovernmental 
(quality) 
Average of response to quality survey item 
for local, state, and federal categories 
4.34 .63 3 5 
Nonprofit (quality) Likert scale response to quality survey item 
for nonprofit category 
3.73 1.00 1 5 
Private (quality) Likert scale response to quality survey item 
for private category 
3.32 1.14 1 5 
Local (quantity) Likert scale response to quantity survey 
item for local category 
1.83 1.02 1 4 
State (quantity) Likert scale response to quantity survey 
item for state category 
1.93 1.08 1 5 
Federal (quantity) Likert scale response to quantity survey 
item for federal category 
1.99 1.05 1 4 
Intergovernmental 
(quantity) 
Average of response to quantity survey 
item for local, state, and federal categories 
1.92 .85 1 4 
Nonprofit (quantity) Likert scale response to quantity survey 
item for nonprofit category 
2.58 1.14 1 5 
Private (quantity) Likert scale response to quantity survey 
item for private category 
2.45 1.05 1 5 
Industry per capita $1000s of employee compensation from 
manufacturing industries per capita 
2.53 1.60 0 7.06 
State expenditures $1s of state environmental expenditures per 
capita 
71.95 43.59 14.93 266.97 
Median AQI Annual median AQI for initial year of 
observation 
50.81 12.38 24 97 
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Appendix B. R2 from Bivariate Regression Models 
 Quality Quantity 
Local .085* .022 
State .001 .002 
Federal .019 .0004 
Intergovernmental .041+ .006 
Nonprofit .021 .0000 
Private .059* .0003 
Note: +<.1, *<.05, **<.01, ***<.001. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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